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Abstract 
The creation of a single European railway area is the overall policy objective of the European Union 
for the railway industry. Rail infrastructure management is seen as a natural monopoly to be operated 
at a national scale. Competition is possible downstream in the provision of rail transport services. A 
European-wide market of rail transport services would benefit from larger economies of scale, and 
competition would ensure such efficiencies are passed down to European citizens and businesses. 
However, the reform process has been set back by Member States that disagree with the full vertical 
separation of infrastructure management and transport service provision, as well as by Member States 
that want to delay the full liberalization of the industry. As a consequence, inconsistent national 
models are emerging and non-sustainable asymmetries between Member States are creating tensions. 
The Fourth Railway Package is the opportunity to conclude the European railway reform process, both 
for commercial services and for public contract services. Imaginative solutions are necessary to reach 
a workable consensus. 
Keywords 
Railways, vertical separation, liberalization, public service obligations 
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I. The Single European Railway Area 
1. A policy objective difficult to attain 
The creation of a single European railway area is the overall policy objective of the European Union 
for the railway industry. The single market objective is shared with other network industries: 
telecommunications (Single Digital Market), air transport (Single European Sky), energy (Internal 
Energy market), postal services, etc.  
It is widely accepted that significant efficiencies can be reached if railway operations move from 
the national to the continental scale. Such a principle applies both to passenger and freight rail 
transport. Furthermore, environmental, security and road congestion reasons recommend promoting 
the growth of rail transport
1
 (Shift2Rail). 
However, the application in the railway industry of the already established regulatory tool-kit for 
the reform of network industries is proving to be quite challenging. To start with, the national 
regulatory authorities have often lacked the required independence. Such independence is particularly 
relevant in the railway industry, due to the dominant influence of public undertakings in the industry 
and the need to separate the regulatory roles from the service provision roles. Access regulation has 
also been unevenly implemented. An agreement on the regulatory framework on public service 
obligations was reached with considerable difficulty (Regulation 1370/2007).
2
 
Member States have been particularly reluctant to eliminate exclusive rights.
3
 A gradual approach 
allowed the liberalization, firstly, of the international groupings for international transport (1993), 
secondly, of international freight services (2006), thirdly, of national freight services (2007), and 
fourthly, of international passenger services (2010). Consecutive “packages” of legislation have 
advanced the liberalization process, at the expense of simplicity in the regulatory framework and legal 
certainty. 
Moreover, numerous infringement procedures have been necessary to attain a minimum common 
denominator in the implementation of the railway packages across the Union
4
.  
More than twenty years after the first attempts to open the market, the bulk of rail services in 
Europe are still provided under exclusive rights granted at a national level and mostly to the traditional 
public monopolies. Opposition to liberalization has not been limited to passenger services subject to 
public service obligations (in particular suburban and regional services). On the contrary, exclusive 
rights continue to be defended in several Member States for commercial services such as high-speed 
services. 
                                                     
1
 European Commission (2011). Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area. Towards a competitive and resource 
efficient transport system, COM/2011/144. 
2
 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 23 October 2007, on public passenger 
transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70, DOUE 
31.12.2007. 
3
 Nash, C. A. (2008). Passenger railway reform in the last 20 years – European experience reconsidered. Research in 
Transport Economics, vol. 22, pp. 61–70; Gómez-Ibañez, J. & De Rus, G. (2006). Competition in the Railway Industry. 
An International Comparative Analysis, Edward Elgar. 
4
 Versiluis, E. & Tarr, E. (2013). “Improving Compliance with European Union Law via Agencies: The Case of the 
European Railway Agency”. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, issue 2, pp. 316-333. 
Juan J. Montero 
2 
2. Justification of the difficulties 
It should be understood, however, that solid reasons recommend a specific liberalization strategy for 
the rail industry. There are objective circumstances that differentiate the railway industry from other 
network industries. 
The railway infrastructure is considered a natural monopoly and is declared as such in the Recast 
Directive.
5
 Competition has been excluded from the management of the rail infrastructure yet, at the 
same time, railway infrastructures require a very significant public investment.
6
 
The provision of many rail transport services would not be competitive if the full cost of 
infrastructure would have to be included in the price of the transport service to the passenger.
7
 This is 
even more the case for freight transport services in Western Europe. As a consequence, it is not simple 
to define an objective pricing principle for access, such as the cost orientation principle imposed for 
regulated access in telecommunications or postal services.  
A very significant proportion of passenger services have public service obligations.
8
 Compensation 
for public service obligations can reach a very substantial amount
9
. Exclusive rights are a 
proportionate compensation for such obligations. The scope of full competition is, therefore, 
substantially reduced. Competition in this segment can only be introduced as the so-called 
“competition for the market”, that is, competition in the tender procedure to assign the public service 
obligation contract. 
Other reasons do not seem so stand so solidly on the arguments put forward: The advantages of 
national integrated rail systems (infrastructure, transport services, rolling stock production, etc.), 
internal cross-subsidies in the public monopolies or national difficulties in implementing reform in rail 
companies, etc. 
II. Recent Achievements 
There have been some noteworthy achievements in the process of consolidating a single European rail 
market in the last five years. 
Firstly, the institutional framework and market structure defined in the Railway Directives is finally 
taking shape, even though obstacles persist and harmonization is not as complete as necessary. A high 
number of infringement procedures initiated by the European Commission has been necessary. 
Independent regulatory authorities have been established in the Member States, yet full 
independence is not universally guaranteed and not all the national regulatory authorities enjoy the 
necessary resources. However, the institutions have been established and formal independence 
granted. The next step is for these institutions to gather experience and to strengthen their position. 
Experiences such as the consolidation of transport regulators into a single entity (Italy) or the creation 
                                                     
5
 Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 21 November 2012, establishing a single 
European railway area, DOUE 14.12.2012, para. 71. 
6
 Subsidies to infrastructures summed 37 billion euros in EU-15 in 2005 according to European Environmental Agency 
2007): Size, structure and distribution of transport subsidies in Europe, EEA Technical Report No 3/2007, p. 15. 
7
 Sanchez-Borràs, Nash, Abrantes & Lopez-Pita (2010). Rail access charges and the competitiveness of high speed trains. 
Transport Policy, vol. 17, pp. 102-109. 
8
 Only three Member States have less than half of the total passenger/kilometers out of public service obligation schemes 
(Finland, France and Sweden), data in Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment of the Fourth Railway 
Package, 2013, Annex 4, p. 4. 
9
 Subsidies amounted to around 20 billion euros in 2008 for the 27 member States. Commission Staff Working Document, 
Impact Assessment of the Fourth Railway Package, 2013, Annex III, page 47. 
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of multi-network regulators (Germany, Netherlands and Spain) may be positive for the long-term 
maturity of the regulatory practice. 
Some degree of vertical separation between network management and transport service provision 
has been ensured. Formal separation in different legal entities is quite common in the European Union. 
Some Member States ensure full separation, while other Member States, led by Germany, have 
developed a more restrained holding model. As explained below, this is one of the most relevant 
obstacles to completing the industry’s reform process. 
A formal procedure for path allocation and definition of access charges is taking place across the 
Union. Access regulation will be the main role of the national regulatory authorities and becoming the 
true cornerstone of the European single railway area. 
At last, transparency has been introduced in the financing of public service obligations. Regulation 
1370/2007 is a complex piece of legislation and it challenges deep-rooted administrative practices in 
many of the Member States. However, the effort of the European Commission to define a coherent 
regulatory framework
10
 for the compensation of public service obligations across all industries is 
finally succeeding, also in the railway industry. 
Secondly, Directive 2012/24/UE was adopted in November 2012. The Recast Directive simplified 
a significant part of the acquis communautaire on rail transport. It was definitely necessary after three 
legislative packages had introduced successive reforms in the original rail transport directives, some of 
them adopted as early as 1991. A more systematic legal regime dealing with the institutional 
framework, vertical separation, licensing, and network access was adopted. 
Thirdly, in January 2013, after years of preparation,
11
 the Commission proposed the so-called 
Fourth Railway Package. If successful, it will complete the reform process of the European railway 
area. It includes three Directives and three Regulations. 
An amendment of the Recast Directive is proposed
12
. It sets 2019 as the date for the full 
liberalization of national passenger services. It also reviews the institutional framework and the legal 
regime governing network access. 
An amendment of Regulation 1370/2007 is proposed.
13
 The main novelties are: 1) the requirement 
of a transport plan to objectively justify imposing public service obligations; 2) the exclusion of direct 
assignment of public service obligations contracts to public companies. Competition for the market 
(tenders) will be introduced for the provision of national passenger services with costly public service 
obligations; and 3) ancillary provisions on caps for the contract volumes and on rolling stock 
availability. 
                                                     
10
 Montero, Brokelmann, Menéndez, Cruz Ferrer, Franco & Medina (2012). La financiación pública de las obligaciones de 
Servicio público. Tirant lo Blanch. 
11
 See for instance the studies commissioned by the European Commission: EVERIS (2010). Study on Regulatory Options 
on Further Market Opening in Rail Passenger Transport; and Steer Davies Gleave (2012). Study on further action at 
European level regarding market opening for domestic passenger transport and ensuring non-discriminatory access to rail 
infrastructure and services. 
12
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2012/34/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, as regards the opening 
of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and the governance of the railway infrastructure, 
COM(2013) 29 final, 30.1.2013. 
13
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 
concerning the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail. COM(2013) 28, 30.1.2013. 
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A recast of the existing Directives on railway safety
14
 and interoperability
15
 is proposed to 
strengthen harmonization and interoperability. These are long-lasting objectives that will require the 
continuous support of the EU authorities, also in terms of financing. A new Regulation on the 
normalization of the accounts of railway undertakings is also proposed.
16
 
Finally a new Regulation for the European Union Agency for Railways is proposed. The European 
regulator has as objective to facilitate market entrance of new operators and reduce administrative cost 
for railway undertakings. 
III. Remaining Challenges 
At this stage of the liberalization process, there are still different visions about the market structure in 
the European single railway area as well as about the final liberalization schedule, both for commercial 
services and for services with public service obligations. 
1. Vertical separation 
The structure of the market is still an open issue.
17
 Right from an early stage, the European 
Commission supported an orthodox vertical separation of activities.
18
 National monopolies with 
abundant public finance would manage the progressively harmonized rail infrastructure, a natural 
monopoly. Large transport service providers would reach a continental scale after the consolidation of 
the industry and they would be in the position to exhaust the inherent economies of scale. Competition 
between fewer continental players would ensure cost reductions are passed down to consumers, 
ensuring consumer welfare. 
Some Member States, led by Germany, have always opposed a strict vertical separation. It is 
argued that such separation creates inefficiencies in the management of the national rail system. 
Furthermore, the larger efficiencies that could be delivered by the scale of the European single railway 
area will be delayed in time, due to the lack of interoperability of the national rail infrastructures. 
Germany and other Member States implemented a mere formal separation of their national operator, 
with both the network manager and transport service provider depending on a holding company. 
The Court of Justice of the European Union, in a judgment delivered on February 28
th
, 2013,
19
 
supported Germany’s view that the Rail Directives do not really impose a strict vertical separation, but 
merely a legal separation. There are no shortcuts for the formal adoption of a clear legal obligation to 
                                                     
14
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on railway safety (Recast), COM(2013) 31 final, 
30.1.2013. 
15
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the interoperability of the rail system within 
the European Union (Recast), COM(2013) 30 final, 30.1.2013. 
16
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council repealing Regulation (EEC) No 1192/69 of the 
Council on common rules for the normalisation of the accounts of railway undertakings, COM(2013) 26 final, 30.1.2013. 
17
 Nash, C. A., Nilsson, J.E. & Link, H. (2013). Comparing three models for introduction of competition into railways. 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 47, Part 2, May 2013, pp. 191-206; and Van de Velde, Nash, Smith, 
Mizutani, Uranishi, & Zschoche, (2012). Economic effects of Vertical Separation in the railway sector. Report to 
Community for European Railway and Infrastructure Companies. 
18
 Cantos Sánchez, P. (2001). Vertical relationships for the European railway industry. Transport Policy, vol.8, issue 2, pp. 
77-83. Thompson L. (1997). The Benefits of Separating Rail Infrastructure from Operations, in The World Bank Group 
(Publ.): Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note No. 135, December 1997. A similar approach was adopted for the 
electricity and natural gas markets in Directives 2003/54/EC and 2009/73/EC., and for telecommunication networks in 
some countries such as the United Kingdom. 
19
 Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 18 February 2013, Case C-556/10, European Commission v. 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
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be imposed on Member States to fully vertically separate the national rail systems, including economic 
separation
20
. 
The staus quo, in any case, is not sustainable. There is a clear asymmetry between the Member 
States that have already followed the Commission approach and those that decided not to do so. 
Actually, it is paradoxical situation that the rail company obtaining the largest benefits of the full 
vertical separation in other Member States is controlled by the Member State leading the opposition to 
the separation that ensures a level playing field.  
Blockage could be overcome with a different approach to vertical separation. The Commission has 
proposed in the Fourth Package to allow Member States to close their networks to rail companies from 
Member States where strict vertical separation is not implemented. However, this approach is 
somehow contradictory with the Single Railway Area objectives, as it introduces barriers to market 
integration. 
Another solution could be the adoption of a more demanding regulation on network access. The 
experience in the telecommunications industry, particularly in the sphere of landline telephone 
services, shows that access regulation can ensure very aggressive downstream competition despite the 
vertical integration of the network manager.  
In any case, it seems clear that only by reaching a consensus on market structure will allow us to 
move onto the next debate on the full liberalization of the industry. 
2. Full liberalization of commercial services 
The Fourth Railway Package proposes 2019 as the date for the full liberalization of commercial 
national passenger services. The gradual opening of markets has the preferred approach of the 
European Commission. It has been the preferred option in the liberalization of telecommunications, 
postal services, etc. However, more than twenty years have passed since the initial timid initiatives for 
international groupings for international transport in 1993. It is indeed time to conclude the gradual 
reform of the industry. 
Delays in the decision to fully liberalize the railway industry are generating inconsistencies and 
asymmetries. On the one hand, some Member States have decided to open their national markets to 
competition. However, the lack of harmonization is creating different models. The UK decided at an 
early stage to tender franchises for the provision of passenger services with exclusive rights. Full 
competition (so-called open access) was the option in Italy. The Spanish authorities have decided to 
grant special rights to new comers to create duopolies with the traditional public monopoly holder. 
The longer it takes to adopt the decision to fully liberalize, the greater the differences will be in the 
national models and ultimately, the more difficult will it be to harmonize the divergent national 
models. 
On the other hand, some Member States have refused to introduce any reform not strictly mandated 
by the European authorities as is clearly the case of France.
21
 This is creating a very relevant 
asymmetry, as rail undertakings with solid exclusive rights in their home countries are benefitting 
from the possibility of expanding operations into Member States that have decided to pursue a 
liberalization policy. The asymmetry is triggering the introduction of both formal and informal 
reciprocity requirements, a situation clearly contrary to the notion of a single European railway area. 
                                                     
20
 The CJEU confirmed the no binding legal value of Annex5 to the Communication on the implementation of the railway 
infrastructure package Directives, a mere Commission Staff working document that was never published in the official 
journal. 
21
 Quinet, E. (2006). France: Avoiding competition, in Gómez-Ibañez, J.A. & de Rus, G. (editors): Competition in the 
railway industry: An international comparative analysis, Edward Elgar. 
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3. Competition for public service contracts 
The Fourth Railway Package proposes an amendment of Regulation 1370/2007 to eliminate the direct 
assignment to public rail companies of relevant public service contracts. Such a measure would 
significantly transform the provision of such services given that currently, most of them are directly 
assigned to the traditional national monopoly-holder.
22
 
Interesting experiences exist in some member States. In the UK, the tendering of franchises 
model
23
 is quite similar to the model proposed by the Commission. In Germany, tenders have been 
organized for some regional services.
24
 Other relevant experiences exist in countries such as Sweden,
25
 
the Netherlands
26
 and Italy.
27
 
The Commission proposes to reduce two of the identified barriers to entry to these tenders. Firstly, 
it proposes to reduce the volume of the contracts in terms of train-km, demanding either 10 million 
train-km or one third of the total national volume under public service contract.
28
 It has been identified 
in the German experience that large volume contracts are systematically assigned to the traditional 
railway undertaking. 
Secondly, the barrier of entry of having access to rolling stock is reduced by imposing on Member 
States the obligation either to ensure the availability of rolling stock leasing companies, or to ensure 
that the residual value risk of the rolling stock is borne by the competent authority organizing the 
tender. 
As a result, a single European railway area with European-wide rail undertakings competing for 
public service contracts could emerge. Costs for the provision of these services would thereby be 
reduced, for the benefit of both public authorities and EU citizens.  
IV. Conclusion 
The European rail industry demands greater levels of certainty. A process of continuous review of the 
legislation does not benefit any of the players. The Fourth Railway Package should set the definitive 
regulatory framework for the next decade. There is an urgent need to complete a regulatory framework 
that 1) harmonizes the market structure in the different Member States, 2) takes into consideration the 
                                                     
22
 See figures in Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment of the Fourth Railway Package, 2013, Annex 
IV. 
23
 Preston, J. (2008). A Review of Passenger Rail Franchising in Britain: 1996/1997-2006/2007”. Research in 
Transportation Economics, vol. 22, issue 1, pp. 71-77. 
24
 Brenck A. & Peter B. (2007). Experience with Competitive Tendering in Germany, Competitive Tendering of Rail 
Services, ECMT, pp. 139-161; Hunold, M., & Wolf, C. (2013). Competitive Procurement Design: Evidence from 
Regional Passenger Railway Services in Germany, ZEW Center for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No 
13-009, and a more critical approach in Link, H. & Merkert, R. (2011). Success factors and pitfalls of the German rail 
franchising approach. International Journal of Transport Economics, XXXVIII(2), pp. 171-198. 
25
 Alexanderson G. & Hulten S. (2007). Competitive Tendering of Regional and Interregional Rail Services in Sweden. 
Competitive Tendering of Rail Services, ECMT, pp. 165-187. 
26
 Van Dijk H. (2007). Tendering and Decentralization of Regional Rail Passenger Services in the Netherlands. Competitive 
Tendering of Rail Services, ECMT, pp. 127-137, and Van de Velde, Jacobs, & Stefanski (2009). Development of 
Railway Contracting for the National Passenger Rail Services in the Netherlands, 11th Conference on Competition and 
Ownership in Land Passenger Transport. 
27
 Stanta, F. & Galli, M. (2007). Local Railway Tenders in Italy: The Impossible Competition. 9th Conference on 
Competition and Ownership in Land Transport. 
28
 Article 2a.6.b) of the proposed Regulation, based on assessment in Commission Staff Working Document, Impact 
Assessment of the Fourth Railway Package, 2013, Annex VIII. 
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special characteristics of the industry, and 3) allows European citizens to fully benefit from the 
European Railway Area. 
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